in every country's national statistics. The WHO criteria for the presence of life at birth include evidence that the infant is breathing and indications such as the heart beating, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of the voluntary muscles. 8 These and other definitions of viability are continually evolving in response to technological and biomedical innovations and cultural considerations. 9 In the United States, a frequent, but not universal standard is that infants whose birth weight is less than 500 grams (1.1 pounds) and whose gestational age is consistent with 23 weeks or less, are not considered to be viable. Infants appropriate for gestational age at 23 weeks weigh between 450 and 550 grams; at 24 weeks between 500 and 650 grams. 10 A 1992 survey of over 1,000 U.S. neonatologists found that 100% would withhold interventions and initiate compassionate care if the infant was less than 23 weeks gestation; approximately 50% would not intervene at 23 weeks gestation, but that drops to 1% at 25 weeks gestation. 11 Although it was designed to be an instrument pilot test, the authors reported a rather impressive response rate for a one-shot mail survey of 37%, perhaps reflecting the intensity of feelings this topic generates. This study does not state that what they would do in fact truly could be done. In a 1986 survey of maternal-fetal medicine specialists in North America, 14% reported that they would initiate active intervention (cesarean section) at 24 weeks gestation for fetal distress and 18% indicated they would actively intervene for breech presentation; at 26 weeks gestation, over 90% of these physicians would perform a cesarean section if indicated. 12 In European countries such as Great Britain and Sweden, physicians often will not resuscitate infants with birth weights of 750 grams or less. By calculation of birth weight criteria alone, some 23 and 24 week infants are viable and others are not. 13 
Impact of Technology on Neonatal Survival and Long-Term Follow-Up
The U.S. FDA approval of surfactant in 1990 has significantly improved neonatal survival.
14 Surfactant is a substance given directly into the lungs to lower surface tension, thereby improving oxygen absorption in immature lungs. Moreover, during the last 4 years, more generalized use of maternal steroids to accelerate fetal lung maturity has greatly improved neonatal survival. 15 Additionally, early data show significant potential for maternal steroids reducing the incidence and severity of intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH) in newborns. New forms of ventilation like high frequency oscillation and liquid ventilation may also contribute to improved neonatal survival. 16 Table 1 compares the birth weight and gestational-age-specific neonatal survival rate of ELBW infants during 2 consecutive 5 year periods at Loyola University of Chicago Medical Center; survival rates of the presurfactant era (1985 to 1989) are compared to survival rates following the introduction of surfactant in clinical practice (1990 to 1994) . Survival in the 1990 to 1994 groups compared to 1985 to 1989 as classified by birth weight and gestational age improved by 17%. Our neonatal survival analysis involved 774 infants Յ 1,000 grams and 1,480 infants Յ 29 weeks gestation who were alive at 28 days after birth. Infants who died in the delivery room after the initiation of resuscitation were included in the analysis. Infants whose death occurred beyond 28 days of life and small for gestational age (SGA) infants were not included. Infants who are SGA have intrauterine growth restriction due to a variety of maternal factors that often compromise placental blood flow. Their birth weight is much lower than expected for their gestation. A difference of 1 week or 100 grams can have a significant impact on both survival and the quality of life. This is dramatically demonstrated in Table 1 comparing 500-600 grams versus 600-700 grams survival as well as 22-23 weeks versus 23-24 weeks survival.
Viability of an infant is dependent on the biologic potential of the fetus, and also on biomedical technological capacity and local neonatal intensive care expertise. 17 The improved survival data presented here reflect the trend across the United States. The most striking aspect of these data are seen in the 600 to 700 gram infants and those between 24 and 25 weeks gestation, whose survival rate is 69% (600-700 g) and 63% (24-25 weeks) .
Accurate epidemiologic data on ELBW infants are lacking. Many argue that improved outcome data for very low birth weight (VLBW) infants (Ͻ1,500 grams) have been inappropriately extrapolated to the subgroup of ELBW infants (Ͻ1,000 grams), who represent a totally different population. 18 One study of ELBW infants predicts a severe handicap rate of 60%, 38%, and 8% at 23, 24, and 25 weeks gestation, respectively. 19 These handicaps include cerebral palsy, blindness, deafness, severe hypotonia, and developmental delays. Often overlooked in the ELBW infants are the rates of readmission to the hospital and incidence of chronic illnesses, such as asthma.
Allen, Donahue, and Dusman 20 investigated survivability in infants born at 23, 24, and 25 weeks gestation; they reported survival rates of 15%, 56%, and 79%, respectively. Thus morbidity and mortality was significant at 23 weeks gestation compared to 25 weeks gestation. The duration of ventilation, length of hospital stay, visual impairment, intracranial bleed, and brain white matter necrosis, were higher in the 23-week-gestation group compared to later gestation groups. In another study, Hack and her associates 21 compared school-age outcomes of infants weighing less than 750 grams with infants weighing 750 to 22 reported that ELBW infants can appear "normal" at the age of 1 or 2 years, but long-term follow-up to school age revealed a substantial risk for ongoing and emerging developmental problems. These problems only became apparent after 2 or 3 years of life.
The prevention of preterm labor could substantially alleviate this entire dilemma. Of infants born weighing less than 1,500 grams in the United States, 20% of the mothers received no prenatal care. Infant mortality is a critical measure of the health and welfare of a population. It is defined as the number of deaths occurring within the first year of life per 1,000 live births. The high infant mortality rate in the United States compared to other nations is mainly due to the high rate of preterm births and associated low birth weight infants among the poor. 23 Despite regionalization of perinatal care and improved technology with tocolytic drugs to stop labor, the infant mortality rate has not significantly improved. 24 Infants weighing less than 750 grams make up fewer than 1% of all live births, and this small percentage of infants requires enormous expenditures of neonatal resources, and later, ongoing expenses for special education. Many argue that financial resources used to keep infants less than 750 grams alive can be better allocated to improve education and prenatal care, as is done in many Western European countries.
Management Strategies and Ethical Decisionmaking
In recent years, studies of neonatal intensive care units have revealed the contextualized and complex nature of decisionmaking. [25] [26] [27] These investigations have shown that ethical dilemmas evolve within and are constrained by the biomedical culture of the NICU. Within this sociomedical cultural setting, health providers, parents, and families actively negotiate the meaning of medical treatments for critically ill infants. [28] [29] [30] In her discussion of decisionmaking in neonatal intensive care, Rhoden 31 suggests several strategies that might be applied when prognostic indicators are uncertain: (1) the "statistical prognostic strategy" in which treatment is withheld from infants who appear to have a grim prognosis; (2) the "wait until certainty strategy" in which all infants are treated aggressively until it is virtually certain that either death or irreversible coma will be the result; or (3) the "individualized prognostic strategy" in which treatment is generally initiated and regularly re-evaluated as to its efficacy. To this we add another approach often employed by neonatal specialists. We call this the "patchwork strategy." In this approach, individual medical problems are treated and managed separately, almost without consideration of long-term sequelae. This strategy lures intensivists and families alike on to the "treatment train," as it has been called by Nelson and his colleagues. 32 Once on the train, it is hard to get off. Similar to Rhoden's approaches to decisionmaking, Jecker and Pagon 33 outline several strategies when faced with uncertain conditions and outcomes based on "probabilities." The first approach would withhold treatment from infants who are unlikely to benefit from the intervention; determinations would
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be made on the basis of statistical information regarding treatment outcomes. They contend that this scheme judges the "worst possible outcome" as saving an infant who might be severely impaired. As Jecker and Pagon point out, the drawbacks of this approach are that the statistical data may not be available or accurate and that some infants who might have lived will die. The second strategy, like Rhoden's, would initiate treatment on all infants who are potentially viable until there is greater clarity concerning the probability that the infant would live a life of diminished quality or die. Here, of course, the problem is the uncertain and ambivalent determination of quality of life. The authors argue that this approach is based on the assumption that the worst possible scenario would be diminished efforts to save an infant who might survive.
The final strategy recognizes the parents' critical role in making decisions about their infant, decisions that have serious implications for every aspect of their life. In this strategy, treatment would be initiated for all infants, but parents would be allowed the option of requesting the termination of treatment before it became certain that their infant would die or be severely disabled. Jecker and Pagon argue that this approach takes an "intermediate" course in seeking the advice of parents and other family members in negotiating and managing the ambiguities of neonatal uncertainty. In these circumstances, parents' concerns about what they would consider to be the worst possible outcome are actively solicited.
In the United States, practitioners tend to follow the "treat until certain" or the "patchwork" strategies for decisionmaking when faced with ambiguous and equivocal information. Both approaches ensure that all errors are made in one direction -on the side of life. The legacy of the Baby Doe regulations and high public expectations have contributed significantly to the use of these strategies by U.S. neonatologists.
To be forewarned is to be forearmed. Table 2 lists some factors to be considered in the management of ELBW infants. There is a critical need to involve the parents in decisionmaking before sophisticated and sometimes futile treatment is initiated. Maternal history and parental wishes can and should influence the decisionmaking process. Some parents may want everything done regardless of the infant's condition; other parents may request that interventions be withheld for fear of raising a child with severe handicaps. Parental responses to the emotional tension engendered in the course of treating their seriously ill infant affect determinations about the use of medical interventions. In the pre-Baby Doe era, the physician in attendance usually made a unilateral decision regarding viability. Today, this is rare and parents have significant input. Often, parents can make a choice legally that physicians might not or cannot make. 34 Lack of good communication is the major reason for parent-staff conflict and the initiation of a lawsuit. The sense of powerlessness of the parents, combined with their strong desire to gain greater control of the situation, occasionally results in unforeseeable and sometimes volatile parental behavior. For example, a physician father (dermatologist) was acquitted in 1995 of manslaughter charges in Michigan for disconnecting the ventilator on his 25-week-gestation, 800-gram son after resuscitation was initiated. The data presented here would predict over an 80% chance of survival for an infant this size and gestation. This decision could significantly affect numerous medicolegal cases involving the ELBW infants around the world. 35 Moreover, occasionally some cases generate significant media attention, leading to publicly debated ethical dilemmas, which places added pressure on both parents and healthcare providers. 36 We believe that birth weight should not be considered as the single most important factor in determining viability. Instead, we contend that gestational age is actually a more critical factor in considering treatment goals. Elsewhere, we reported the survival of a 280-gram (9.9 ounces) infant in our neonatal unit; this baby was the smallest known surviving infant in the world. 37 The infant's survival attracted considerable and sometimes distorted media coverage, but little attention was given to the fact that she was 26- 6 7 _ weeks gestation by reliable dates. At birth, she was severely growth restricted due to numerous factors. She is now 7 years old, developing normally, and in second grade. In late 1997, we successfully discharged an infant who weighed 360 grams (12 ounces) at birth. This is the second smallest infant to survive in the United States. These experiences contribute to our conviction that gestational age, and not birth weight, is the critical factor in determining treatment interventions.
Developing precise guidelines for decisionmaking for difficult sociomedical questions is problematic. There is a definite lack of social consensus on the value of initiating aggressive life-sustaining treatments for ELBW infants. We do not believe that these infants should be rescued at all costs. Consideration of financial issues in relation to the treatment of critically ill infants is debatable. Traditionally, health providers and parents alike rejected the notion that the cost of medical care should be a factor in decisions to implement lifesaving therapies. However, currently, it is not unusual for an ELBW infant to incur a bill approaching 1 million dollars for a prolonged neonatal stay. Can one put a price tag on a human life? When medical resources are limited, the question of appropriate use of neonatal technologies becomes absolutely relevant to the decisionmaking process. If treatment appears to be medically futile, it is necessary to question the enormous costs of initiating therapies that may only prolong the dying process. Under these conditions, it would be irresponsible not to consider the potentially burdensome expenditures associated with the treatment of ELBW infants. The frequent media highlighting of "miracle babies" rarely provides a balanced discussion of the potential future for these children and their families, nor of society's willingness to provide lifelong support. It is essential to avoid characterizing management of uncertain benefit as "doing everything possible." If some parents and practitioners persist in demanding miracles, we must advocate collectively for an appropriate societal response to ensure some measure of quality of life for each child and his or her family. 38 
Presenting parents with a plan and options is critical prior to delivery. From a medicolegal aspect, many people argue that, when there is doubt, infants should be resuscitated. This approach is based on the assumption that it is better to defend a physician for treating to save a life than defending the physician for not treating and allowing an infant to die. We recommend using a dynamic commonsense approach to achieve consensus among all involved. We often tell parents that if it appears that potential viability is borderline, we would place the infant on a scale in the delivery room. If the infant is less than 500 grams and appears less than 23 to 24 weeks gestation, with very thin skin, underdeveloped genitalia, and fused eyes, we would not initiate resuscitation. It should be noted that the majority of these infants are born with some heart rate. We also teach house staff that if any doubt exists and the situation is chaotic in an emotionally charged delivery room, then they should resuscitate the infant. Upon admission to the NICU, a more thorough, reasoned evaluation can take place. This is especially true when one does not have the benefit of serial ultrasounds or adequate prenatal care to assess gestation. These infants often precipitously deliver before any discussion or plan with the family.
Resuscitation is not guided by gender, but parents are told that females tend to have a less stormy neonatal course. 39 Parents are also forewarned of statistical outcomes and dangers ahead. For example, we advise parents that the survival rate for a 23- _ week gestation infant who weighs 520 grams (1.1 pounds) is most likely less than 10%. We also reinforce the idea that we rely on the infant to "guide" our decision by his or her developmental features and symptoms. If we are providing an infant with full life-sustaining treatment with little or no response or when a devastating intracranial hemorrhage occurs, we advise the parents that we are simply prolonging the infant's death and we discuss the possibility of withdrawing life support. Approximately 50% of infants born weighing less than 3 pounds will develop an intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH). 40 This usually occurs during the first week of life. No specific etiology has been identified. These hemorrhages can range from very mild to severe relative to the infant's short-term clinical condition and long-term outcome. A grade 4 IVH with extensive parenchymal involvement with concomitant anemia and metabolic acidosis portends a grave prognosis. In extended discussions with the family, including staff physicians, nurses, social workers, and chaplains caring for their infant, data and potential outcomes are presented and a unanimous decision must be reached. In these situations, we would discontinue mechanical ventilation and compassionately reassure parents that their son or daughter will not suffer. We emphasize that we will continue to provide basic nutrition and keep the baby warm. Knowing that their infant did not suffer can avoid a pathological grieving process that can adversely affect their life.
Conclusion
Infant survival at 23 weeks gestation is approximately 20% and at 28 weeks gestation it exceeds 90%. Figure 1 presents a flow diagram in the management of these infants. That 23-25-week period is filled with ambiguity and uncertain long-term outcome. Based on our experience with over 1,400 ELBW infants over the last 10 years, we feel comfortable respecting parents' wishes not to initiate delivery room resuscitation in infants who are less than 600 grams with a gestational age of 23-24 weeks. We also encourage discontinuation of life support in resuscitated infants who fail to oxygenate adequately (less than 90% oxygen saturation) despite surfactant, mechanical ventilation, and cardiovascular support. In these instances, the infant's physical development, or more precisely, the infant's lack of development, dictates compassionate withdrawal. In the event of intracranial hemorrhage with involvement of most of the cerebral cortex when accompanied by devastating neurologic findings, withdrawal of life support is discussed.
Despite significant improvement in survival of ELBW infants, their long-term outcomes and quality of life remain guarded. In an evolving era of cost reduction and managed care, precise guidelines for the treatment of ELBW infants will likely be drawn up. Is neonatology a dramatic success or a misguided effort? Three decades of advancements in the medical, surgical, nursing, and respiratory therapy care of ELBW infants have impressively brought a brandnew meaning of viability but has barely nudged morbidity statistics. Many argue that the line between ordinary and extraordinary care is blurred, and the distinction between standard of care and experimental care has all but disappeared. 41 As technology continues to progress, the envelope of viability could very well be pushed back further and further. The viability limit defined by the Japanese Eugenic Protection Act was amended from 24 to 22 completed weeks of gestation in 1991. They report a survival rate of 28% at 22 to 23 weeks and justify this act. 42 The charges of caring for these ELBW infants in an intensive care unit can approach $4,000 daily. Concern about limited healthcare resources will necessitate mandatory discussion on who should receive intensive care and how these decisions are made. We have proposed the following criteria for ELBW infants: (1) advance management planning with the parents of a fetus at-risk; (2) respect for parents' requests for do-not-resuscitate orders for infants weighing less than 600 grams whose gestation is less than 24 weeks; (3) technological restraint in repairing serious anomalies; and (4) acceptance of parental wishes to resuscitate until the infant's lack of physical development "trumps" the best technological interventions. In our NICU, families are alerted to these decisionmaking guidelines ahead of time, before the birth if possible.
In their discussion of the ethical implications of the use of CPR in very low birth weight infants, Meadow and associates 43 suggest that an important use of the concept of futility is the general moral consensus that ineffectual interventions can justifiably be withheld or withdrawn. We agree with their observation that this consensus may ease the unnecessary burden of guilt associated with the difficult process of decisionmaking at the end of life. The death of an infant is usually a devastating experience for parents and their families. Healthcare providers are not immune to the painful and often frustrating determinations regarding the use of lifesaving therapies for critically ill infants. Decisions concerning the medical futility of interventions may be fraught with apprehension and misgivings for everyone involved. Questions of futility are troubling and burdensome precisely because the answers are not clear or compelling. In the future, standards for the appropriate decisionmaking process in the treatment of ELBW infants should help provide a framework for decisionmaking. Decisions will not always be perfect but an open and informed collaborative model will improve the quality of decisions and the comfort with which they are made.
Notes
Commentary: Neonatal Viability in the 1990s: Held Hostage by Technology*
David K. Stevenson and Amnon Goldworth
This article is a thoughtful and well written examination of some of the complex issues that have emerged as a result of recent improvements in the treatment of extremely low birth weight (ELBW) infants, including those who weigh 500 to 600 grams or who are believed to be 23 to 24 weeks gestation. The authors argue that the 23 to 24 week gestation period is filled with ambiguity and flexibility in practice relative to active resuscitation. However, such ambiguity and flexibility is likely to prevail whatever the boundary conditions of viability happen to be. Thus moral guidelines that inform the rescue of an infant believed to be 500 to 600 grams or 23 or 24 weeks gestation are likely to be relevant whatever the boundary conditions are.
The authors have presented a comprehensive survey of management strategies when physicians and parents are confronted with uncertain prognoses. Their own strategy attempts to avoid decisionmaking that is framed solely by the constraints of biomedical technology. Although similar to Jecker and Pagon's third strategy, which seeks the advice of parents and family members in negotiating and managing the ambiguity of neonatal uncertainty, the authors' approach constitutes a framework that deserves attention in its own right.
In addition to the authors' conviction that "There is a critical need to involve the parents in decisionmaking before sophisticated and sometimes futile treatment is initiated," they also believe "that birth weight should not be considered the single most important factor in determining viability" and that "gestational age is actually a more critical factor in considering treatment goals." We concur with the authors' desire to have the parents involved in decisionmaking. However, we would like to discuss some elements of that involvement that seem not to have been emphasized by them.
Parents rely on the facts presented by the physician about the condition of the fetus or neonate. Such facts include the estimated gestational age, which, as the authors recognize, has a considerable bearing on the quality of life of the "person-to-be." But Muraskas and colleagues fail to address the question whether the ability to estimate gestation in pregnancies (or for that matter in the delivery room with cursory physical examination) of the fetus is sufficient for assigning risk with respect to mortality or long-term outcomes. As the literature cited by the authors indicates, there are demonstrable differences in the survival and handicap rates of those infants who are born 1 week apart. Thus an error of 1 week (or possibly less) in judging gestational age can be significant. And even if a physician could successfully determine gestational age, not all infants of the same gestational age have the same individual capacities and there is no accurate way, as the authors recognize, to predict long-term outcomes for infants born at 23 or 24 weeks. It is this perception that probably underpins the authors' "dynamic common sense approach to achieve unanimity with all involved."
There are 3 distinct stages in which significant decisions concerning treatment or nontreatment can be made: the pregnancy stage; the delivery stage, which lasts 15 to 20 minutes; and the post-delivery/intensive care stage. Knowledge expands as we move from the pregnancy through the delivery to the post-delivery stage. This explains the authors' policy when they say, We also teach house staff that if any doubt exists and the situation is chaotic in an emotionally charged delivery room, then they should resuscitate the infant. Upon admission to the NICU, a more thorough, reasoned evaluation can take place.
What the authors fail to mention is that the actions taken in the delivery room, albeit under severe time constraints and based on limited information, can irrevocably determine the future physical and psychological constitution of the person. The child in the NICU has been altered by the medical interventions employed in the delivery room. Such interventions are poignant, since actions taken alter what is being acted upon without anyone really knowing what these alterations will produce. Like obstetric biases, maternal and paternal biases may influence the outcome of a pregnancy at the time of delivery. Thus the incorporation of parental wishes into a decisionmaking algorithm as to whether to resuscitate may inadvertently introduce "superviability" or doom for the individual who is ultimately dependent on the application of technologies for any chance of survival. Given this circumstance, what should the nature of the parental involvement be?
We agree that, "Presenting parents with a plan and options is critical prior to delivery." This is particularly important given the inability of the mother to make rational decisions in the delivery room. We also agree that the parents should be told prior to delivery that the infant will not be resuscitated if the infant is too immature to be assisted or cannot be assisted technically. Although beyond the scope of the paper, there is an additional reason for not resuscitating, namely, sufficient neurological signs that the infant lacks all or nearly all capacity to relate to other human beings.
For completeness of argument, basis for this policy is as follows: Human interests are dependent on an individual's awareness of internal or external states. But the neonate who is severely damaged neurologically either cannot have any interests or those interests are incapable of being known. A broader interpretation of interests permits us to say that the best interests of the neonate, as with any human being, are not served if he or she will be wronged, i.e., if the neonate will solely be used as a means to satisfy someone else's ends. Resuscitating and providing other medical support to maintain the viability of a newborn makes the child into an instrument by which to satisfy the interests of others. Neither the more restricted or the broader notion of interest justifies resuscitation.
Aside from the conditions described above, in which the decision not to resuscitate is to be made without parental involvement, how should the decisions of the parents in other circumstances be treated? Although parental decisions that are based solely on self-interest wrong the infant, the life of the infant is so intertwined with the lives of the parents that it is unrealistic to support that they can choose for the infant without choosing for themselves. It is they and not the physician who will have to bear the major burdens of care should the newborn survive. However, the authors indicated that from a legal perspective, many people argue that, when there is doubt, infants should be resuscitated. This approach is based on the assumption that it is better to defend a physician for treating to save a life than defending the physician for not treating and allowing the infant to die. This policy would trump the parents' decision not to treat.
It is not clear whether the authors subscribe to this viewpoint. But legal defense does not, in this instance, make for good moral defense. No physician can with moral equanimity insist on resuscitation unless he or she is prepared to say that the revived child has a chance to live a life of more than minimal experiences or of more than only pain or suffering. Rather than endorsing categorically the view that when in doubt the physician should treat, it would be best to admit that if the physician's doubt is great, it would be best for the physician to defer to the parents.

